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This paper investigates the causal relationships between the military expenditures and military 
burden of the four major sides of the Israeli-Arab conflict, namely, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and 
Syria over the period 1960-2004. We utilize both the causality test suggested by Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995) and the generalized forecast error variance decomposition method of Pesaran 
and Shin (1998). Our findings suggest weak causality that runs usually from Israel’s to Arab’s 
military spending. The strongest links are between Israel and Syria that are still in a state of 
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1. Introduction 
The Israeli-Arab conflict has been one of the longest conflicts that involved either 
directly or indirectly not only Israel and its neighboring Arab countries but also the major super 
powers who acted to maintain their presence and influence in the oil-rich region. The intensity of 
this international battle field is reflected, at least partially, in the hefty portions of the limited 
resources of Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria that were devoted to military expenditures and 
accumulation of weapons. Graph 1 demonstrates the exceptionally high military burdens, 
measured as the shares of military expenditures in GDP, of these countries over the period 1960-
2004. For example, Egypt’s military burden exceeded 50% in the mid-70s while Israel’s topped 
20%. Although the 90s, following the initiation of peace talks, have witnessed a drastic decline 
to levels below 10% for all countries, these levels of military burden remained very high in 
international standards. In light of the frequent confrontations and the hefty military budgets, 
many studies have indicated that that Israel and its Arab neighbors are engaged in an arms race. 
  A typical examination of the existence of arms race is based on the Richardson (1960) 
model in which the military expenditure, arsenal of weapons, and military personnel of one 
country change in response to those of the rival country. Thus, the dynamics of military 
expenditures are shaped by an action-reaction framework. Understanding these patterns of 
action-reaction among likely rivals is critical in our global world. A country or an international 
institution that provides foreign aid to a country that is involved in arms race may fuel conflicts 
by leading to a rise not only in the military expenditures of that country but also in the military 
expenditures of its rivals. Realizing that the grantee country is involved in an arms race, the 
granting bodies may restrict the use of their funds to growth-enhancing civilian uses, require   3 
compliance to arms control agreements, and exercise political and economic pressures to try to 
cease the hostile operations instead of fueling conflict.
1  
Arms races are often examined using Granger causality tests that have been shown to 
have non-standard asymptotic properties if the variables are integrated or cointegrated.
2 
Moreover, the need for pretests for unit roots and cointegration and the inapplicability when the 
variables have different orders of integration further add to the distortions associated with 
Granger causality from within VAR or vector error correction (VEC) settings. Examples of using 
the traditional Granger causality to assess the existence of arms races include, but not limited to, 
Kollias and Makrydakis (1997), Dunne et al. (2005), and Yildirim and Ocal (2006). Only few 
studies have addressed the existence and the dynamics of the Israeli-Arab arms race. These 
include Linden (1991), Chen et al. (1996), Seiglie and Liu (2002), and Sprecher and DeRouen 
(2002). A brief review of their findings follows in section 3. 
In this paper we reassess the dynamics of the Israeli-Arab conflict focusing mainly on 
whether an arms race exists between Israel and its major adversaries, namely, Egypt, Jordan and 
Syria.
3 Unlike other studies that have used the traditional Granger causality test or causality from 
within a VEC, we utilize a causality procedure suggested by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). Their 
procedure requires the estimation of an augmented VAR that guarantees the asymptotic 
distribution of the Wald statistic. Also, the procedure does not require pre-testing for integration 
                                                 
1 Kinsella (1994) and others found that American aid to Israel has contributed to its economy and decreased the 
likelihood of military intervention in the region. No such evidence was found for the Soviet aid to Arab countries. 
Moreover, the U.S. provided foreign aid to Egypt after signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1979.  
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or cointegration properties of the VAR system, and thus avoids the potential biases of pre-
testing. 
We conduct our causality analysis using two specifications; first, causality in a bivariate 
VAR system in which we examine causality between Israel’s military measures and each of the 
Arab countries measures separately; second, causality in a quadvariate VAR system in which the 
military measures of the four countries are present in the system. This specification allows for 
possible complementary relationships as well as “free riding” among the military measures of the 
Arab countries that face a common Israeli threat. Additionally, we construct an aggregate 
measure for the Arab military expenditure and military burden for the case that Israel reacts to 
the Arab bloc as a group rather than individually.
4  
To gauge the sensitivity of our results we incorporate the likely structural break dates as 
reported by Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2008) in our causality analysis. Most of the previous 
studies failed to account for structural breaks when testing for arms races. Furthermore, we 
examine whether the dynamics of the Israeli-Arab conflict changed following the peace 
agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1979. 
In addition to using the Toda and Yamamoto (1995), we examine the out-of-sample 
causality using the generalized forecast error variance decomposition method of Pesaran and 
Shin (1998). Unlike the traditional orthogonalized Cholesky method, this method does not 
require ordering of the variables in the VAR system, something that is often determined arbitrary 
given the absence of sound theoretical base. 
The remaining of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the 
major events that shaped the Israeli-Arab conflict and their impact on accumulation of arms. A 
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brief review of the few studies that addressed the existence and the dynamics of the conflict is 
provided in section 3. Section 4 lays out the econometric foundations of our empirical 
investigation. Description of our data and its sources are presented in section 5, followed by a 
discussion of the causality tests and FEVD results in section 6. Section 7 concludes.   
2. The Israeli-Arab Conflict: A Timeline 
  Several wars and military actions took place in the region since the UN proposed its 
“Partition Plan” in 1947. The plan called for the establishment of two independent states for 
Arabs and Jews in Palestine. However, the Arabs rejected this plan and shortly after the 
withdrawal of the British mandate forces and the declaration of Israel they declared war on 
Israel. By the end of the “Independence War” or “Al-Nakba” (Arabic for the disaster), hundreds 
of thousands of Palestinians were expelled or fled their homes and Israel ended up controlling 
most of Palestine’s land. 
  Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt’s president Nasser and the 
blockade of the Tiran Straits to Israeli shipping in 1956, Israel, backed by Britain and France, 
invaded and subsequently occupied Sinai and Gaza Strip. Soviet warnings of intervention on 
behalf of Egypt and American economic pressures forced the three parties to withdraw from the 
occupied lands by early March 1957. The hostile operations reached a peak in 1967 when in a 
massive and quick assault that lasted for six days, Israel succeeded in seizing Sinai and Gaza 
Strip from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria.  
On October 6, 1973 Israel was caught by surprise as the Egyptian and Syrian forces 
coordinated a joint attack and advanced beyond the cease-fire lines into Sinai and the Golan 
Heights and inflicted heavy casualties on the Israeli Army. Israel counter-attacked and drove the 
Egyptian and Syrian armies back and advanced deep into Egypt and Syria. A ceasefire ended the   6 
war and paved the way for peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel that culminated in a 
peace treaty in 1979. According to this agreement, the state of war between the two countries 
was terminated; Israel pulled out its armed forces and civilians from Sinai; and normal 
diplomatic relations were established. This dramatic Egyptian move was confronted by a unified 
Arab front that objected to a separate peace treaty that neglected the Palestinian issue. Moreover, 
Egypt was suspended from the Arab League, and most Arab countries cut their diplomatic ties 
with Egypt. 
Once the Israel-Egypt peace treaty was finalized, the focus shifted to the Palestinian 
issue. The articles in the treaty that called for the establishment of an autonomous self-governing 
authority in the West Bank and Gaza were never materialized. Palestinian forces were stationed 
in Southern Lebanon under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and 
initiated attacks on Northern Israel. On June 1982, Israel attacked Palestinian targets in Southern 
Lebanon with the stated objective of driving PLO forces to the north. However, Israel extended 
its operations and bombed many Lebanese cities, including Beirut, as well as some Syrian 
military targets. After a long siege of Beirut, PLO forces were forced out of Lebanon and Israel 
withdrew from most of the Lebanese territories, however, maintained a “security zone” of 
approximately 10 miles north of the border that was eventually evacuated in 2000. 
 The growing frustration among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories over the status 
quo, their suffering under the occupation, and the lack of progress towards a permanent solution 
to their nationalistic claims led to many violent incidents and confrontations with the Israeli 
Army in late 1987. The Intifada (Arabic for popular uprising) that began in Gaza and spread to 
other cities and villages involved hundreds of thousands including children, teenagers and 
women. This popular resistance included not only stone throwing, burning tires, Molotov   7 
cocktails and the erection of barricades but also massive demonstrations, general strikes, refusal 
to pay taxes, and boycotts of Israeli products. The Palestinian uprising continued, though to a 
lower intensity, until the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. In the midst of this period Israel 
suffered a massive missile attack by Iraq when the US backed by a wide international coalition 
drove Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991. The end of the Gulf War paved the way to direct negotiations 
between Israel and Arab countries (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and a joint Jordanian/Palestinian 
delegation that excluded the PLO due to Israel’s objection) in Madrid in 1991 under the 
sponsorship of the US and USSR. 
After several intensive rounds of negotiations, Israel and PLO signed the "Declaration of 
Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements" in Oslo on August 20, 1993. The Oslo 
Accords called for the withdrawal of Israel from parts of Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority (a self-ruled entity that was extended later on to 
include more cities and villages in the West Bank) and negotiating for a permanent agreement 
that would begin no later than August 1996. After some progress was made in the Israeli-
Palestinian channel, a peace treaty was signed between Israel and Jordan in 1994. Under the 
terms of the treaty, all the territorial and water disputes were resolved, and the relations between 
the two countries were normalized. 
As the negotiations on a permanent agreement ended in a deadlock, another wave of 
hostile actions by Palestinians and Israelis erupted in 2000 (Al-Aqsa Intifada). In August 2005, 
despite fierce resistance of settlers, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza Strip and some 
settlements in the West Bank. On the Lebanese front, following the kidnapping of two Israeli 
soldiers in Southern Lebanon by Hezbollah in July 2006, Israel raided Lebanon in what later 
called the Second Lebanon War.    8 
Following a decisive victory for Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 
January 2007, a unity government headed by Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas was formed, however, 
Hamas and Fatah reached no agreement on the division of power and responsibilities. The 
disputes led to Hamas forces violently routing Fatah forces and seizing power in Gaza in June 
2007. The Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the Hamas-controlled government 
and appointed an emergency government in the West Bank. The Hamas government continued to 
exercise a de facto authority in the Gaza Strip despite the fact that it received neither Arab nor 
international recognition.  
3. Previous Studies 
The likely Israeli-Arab arms race received negligible attention in the arms race literature, 
mainly due to lack of reliable data. The few studies, surveyed below, that examined the issue 
have conducted the analysis in the context of the determinants of military spending or using the 
traditional causality tests. Generally speaking, these studies mostly reveal a one-way arms race 
from Israeli to Arab military spending.    
In an attempt to analyze the determinants of the Israeli military spending over the period 
1960-1979, McGuire (1982, 1987) estimates a multi-equation model using Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method. The analysis reveals that the responsiveness of Israel to 
its Arab adversaries is very modest whereas Arab's responsiveness to changes in Israeli military 
spending is relatively high. Since McGuire’s studies were conducted on a very short period, their 
conclusions should be taken with a grain of salt. Furthermore, the detection of first order 
autocorrelations coefficients that are close to unity is rather problematic and renders their results 
questionable.   9 
Another study that focused on Israel's determinants of military spending by Mintz and 
Ward (1989) shows that Israel's spending is driven, among other factors, by the Arab military 
expenditure. However, they estimate a system of equations in which the latter is exogenous and 
it has no feedback to Israel’s military spending. Despite the impressive fit of Mintz and Ward’s 
regressions, their results indicate severe autocorrelation.
5 
Diverting from the common approach of assessing arms races through determinants of 
military spending, Linden (1991) applies Granger causality for Israel and an Arab block 
consisting of all the Middle Eastern countries that are reported by SIPRI over the period 1955-
1984. He finds that there is a causal equilibrium relationship with an elasticity close to one that 
runs from Israel’s level of military expenditures to the Arab bloc’s military expenditures. 
However, he finds that disequilibrium behavior dominates Israel military spending as it reacts 
only to current changes in Arab bloc’s level of military expenditures. Thus, he concludes that the 
arms race system between the two adversaries is rather unstable one.  
Chen et al. (1996) use cointegration to investigate the existence of collective action 
among the Arab neighbors of Israel. They show that up to the late 1970s, Egypt was the only 
Arab country involved in a fierce arms race with Israel and that the long-run equilibrium 
relationship disappeared after signing the Camp David Peace Treaty in 1979. The authors find 
that a long-run equilibrium with a weak Arab response was established between the defense 
spending of Israel and the minor front line countries (Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) indicating that 
these countries did not take the opportunity for complete free riding. Furthermore, they conclude 
that a collective action among the four Arab countries constituting the front line with Israel may 
be valid. 
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VEC based on both Engle-Granger and Johansen cointegration procedures is used by 
Beenstock (1998) to assess causality between Israel's military expenditures and a set of 
endogenous variables, including military spending by the Arab confrontation states and 
American military aid, over the period 1960-1994. He detects causality from Arab military 
spending to Israel's when using the Engle-Granger VEC but fails to do so when using the 
Johansen-based VEC. The author does not report tests of causality running from Israel’s to 
Arab’s military spending. 
Seiglie and Liu (2002) apply VEC Granger causality for bivariate, trivariate and 
quadvariate VARs over the period 1948-1991 for various combinations of Arab countries 
(Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria) and Iran with Israel. They find that for most cases, causality runs 
from Israel's military spending to individual Arab countries and combinations of two or three 
Arab countries’ military spending. Moreover, evidence of causality running from Israel's to Arab 
military spending is rather weak or nonexistent.   
Focusing on military actions rather than military expenditures, Sprecher and DeRouen 
(2002) conduct VAR-based causality tests over the 1948-1998 period and find that the Israeli 
military actions are driven by both Arab military actions and domestic political protests while 
Arab military actions are driven by Israeli military actions and seem to decrease in response to 
Israeli actions. Thus, they conclude that a bidirectional causality exists between the military 
actions of the rivals. 
All the previous studies that addressed the existence and the nature of the conflict have 
applied traditional causality tests from within VAR or VEC settings. As we stated earlier, the 
traditional Granger causality tests from within VAR and VEC have non-standard asymptotic 
properties and are subject to pre-testing biases.   11 
4. Econometric Methodologies 
Economists often utilize vector autoregressions (VARs) to make inferences on causal 
relationships among endogenous variables. However Sims et al. (1990) and others have argued 
that, in general, the traditional Wald test for exact linear restrictions on the parameters in levels 
VAR does not have the usual asymptotic distributions if the variables are integrated or 
cointegrated. Proper inferences on VAR levels can be made only if all variables are known to be 
stationary. Otherwise, one can use VAR in differences if all variables are known to be integrated 
of order one but not cointegrated, and through the specification of a VEC model if all variables 
are I(1) and cointegrated. However, in most cases the order of integration and cointegration is 
not known a priori and pretesting for unit roots and cointegration is necessary before conducting 
causality tests. Consequently, the validity of causality tests is conditional on avoiding biases in 
testing for unit roots and cointegration among the variables. Econometric studies report that the 
pre-testing biases might be severe because the power of the unit root test is generally very low 
and tests for Johansen cointegration are not very reliable in finite samples.
6 
A recent procedure proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) bypasses the need for 
potentially biased pre-tests for unit roots and cointegration, common to other formulations. The 
procedure utilizes the Wald test statistic for testing linear restrictions on the coefficients in an 
augmented VAR. The Modified WALD (MWALD) causality test has an asymptotic chi-squared 
distribution with p degrees of freedom in the limit when a VAR (p+dmax) is estimated, where p is 
the optimal lag order in the unrestricted levels VAR and dmax is the maximal order of integration 
of the variables in the VAR system. The causality procedure is implemented in two steps. In the 
first step, the correct order of the unrestricted level VAR (p) is to be determined using one of the 
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information criteria methods, and dmax is to be determined using one of the unit root tests. The 
selected  ) (p VAR is then augmented by the maximal order of integration and a VAR of order 
(p+ max d ) is estimated. Testing for causality in a Bivariate system entails estimating the 
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In the above setting, long-run Granger causality from variable Y2 to variable Y1 is evaluated by 
testing the null hypothesis that 0 ... , 12 1 , 12 = = = p β β , and causality from variable Y1 to Y2 is 
examined by testing the null hypothesis that  0 ... , 21 1 , 21 = = = p β β . Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
proved that the Wald statistic for testing the above null hypothesis converges in distribution to a 
2
p χ random variable. The application of this procedure ensures that the usual test statistic for 
Granger causality has the standard asymptotic distribution and valid inference can be carried out 
(Zapata and Rambaldi, 1997). 
  FEVD has been used repeatedly by economists to examine the out-of-sample properties 
of the relationship between the variables in a VAR system. The method enables researchers to 
shed light not only on the direction but also on the intensity of the causal relationships between 
variables. Generally speaking, FEVD analysis decomposes the forecast error variance of a 
variable into proportions attributed to shocks in other variables, as well as its own. Most 
researchers have used the Cholesky decomposition that requires ordering of the variables. 
Without a sound theoretical base, ordering is arbitrary and the results may vary greatly 
depending on the ordering. Furthermore, the orthogonalized FEVD and impulse response   13 
functions are unlikely to be appropriate for analyzing arms races (Smith et al., 2000). As an 
alternative, Pesaran and Shin (1998) proposed a generalized FEVD that circumvent the need for 
ordering the variables and produce unique results by utilizing the contemporaneous correlations 
of the variables under investigation. Unlike the traditional decomposition the generalized FEVD 
does not impose the restriction that the underlying shocks to the VAR are orthogonalized prior to 
decomposing the forecast error variances.   
5. Data Description and Sources 
Raw data were obtained from the following two main sources. (1) Real military 
expenditures in 2003 constant prices in US dollars as well as the share of military expenditures in 
GDP for the years 1988-2004 which were obtained from the SIPRI online database available at 
http://www.sipri.org. (2) Real military expenditures in 1993 constant prices in US dollars and the 
share of military expenditures in GNP for the period 1963-1987 which were obtained from a 
database compiled by Beenstock (1998). For the years 1960-1963 we derived the real GNP series 
using growth rates from the World Development Indicators (WDI) online database 
(http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline), with the exception of Jordan for which the growth 
rates were taken from the PWT database available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu. Military 
expenditures were converted to real 2000 prices US dollars using the GDP deflator and the 
GNP/GDP ratio series from the WDI online database. The final product consists of military 
expenditures in US dollars at 2000 constant prices and the military burden proxied by the share 
of military expenditures in GDP. 
We also constructed an aggregated series for the three Arab countries to which we refer 
as “Arab” to allow for possible collective action of Arabs against Israel as advised by Olson 
(1971). For real military expenditures this series is simply the sum of the military expenditures   14 
whereas for military burden, it is defined as this sum divided by the total GDP of these countries. 
These series are dominated by the figures of Egypt, the largest economy among the front line 
countries. 
6. Results 
Our causality analysis is conducted under two specifications. First, causality in a bivariate 
VAR system in which we examine causality between Israel’s military measures and each of the 
Arab countries measures separately. Second, causality in a quadvariate VAR system in which the 
military measures of the four countries are present in the system. This specification allows for 
possible complementary relationships as well as “free riding” among the military measures of the 
Arab countries that face a common threat. 
A necessary step for causality tests based on the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) is to 
determine the maximal order of integration of the series in the VAR system. The results of the 
ADF test for the real military expenditures and the military burden for the four countries and the 
aggregated “Arab” series are reported in Table 1. We determined the optimal lag order based on 
SIC. All series are found to be integrated of order 1. Thus, the maximum order of integration 
(dmax) in the VAR system is 1 throughout. 
Table 2 presents the results of the causality tests for the bivariate specification over the 
whole period 1960-2004. The optimal lag order of the VAR system is determined using SIC with 
maximum 4 lags allowed. The reported lags represent the lag order under which no serial 
correlation of order up to 4 was detected. When real military expenditures are considered, the 
results indicate that causality runs, in general, from Israel’s military expenditures to those of 
Egypt, Syria, and the aggregated “Arab” measure. While our results show that Egypt reacts to 
changes in Israel’s military expenditures, a bi-directional causality is detected only between   15 
Israel and Syria, and no causality whatsoever is detected in the case of Jordan. It seems that the 
latter, the smallest economy among the Arab front line countries, does not constitute a factor in 
the arms race in the region and might have chosen to behave as a free rider as implied by Chen et 
al. (1996). The causality from Israel’s military expenditures to Egypt and Syria’s expenditures is 
a weak one since it is valid only at the 10% significance level. This observation is further 
validated when the military measure is the military burden. Causality is now detected only from 
Israel’s military burden to Egypt’s. Moreover, we still find that Israel reacts to changes in Syria’s 
military burden. Once again, no causality is detected between the military measures of Israel and 
Jordan. Our findings are partially in line with Chen et al. (1996) who find that Egypt was the 
only country involved in a fierce arms race with Israel prior to 1979 while Jordan was a free rider 
and Syria was least responsive to changes in Israel’s military spending. 
To further investigate the possibility of Arab collective action and/or free riding we apply 
the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) procedure to a quadvariate VAR in which the military spending 
of each Arab country responds to other Arab countries spending in addition to Israel’s. The 
results of the causality tests are presented in Table 3. When real military spending is taken as the 
military measure we detect bidirectional causality between Israel and Syria with the causality 
from Israel’s to Syria’s military spending being marginally significant. Turning to causality in 
military burden, we only find a barely significant causality running from Egypt's to Israel's 
military burden. 
  Since many economic series, including defense spending may experience structural 
breaks that affect causality analysis we carried out the same tests incorporating two 
endogenously determined structural breaks that have been reported by Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader   16 
(2008).
7 In general, the breakpoints capture the drastic rise in military expenditures prior to the 
last major war, 1973, and the sharp decline following the initiation of peace talks in the late 
1970s. Thus, these breaks take into account the change in the dynamics in the post-1979 era. The 
results (Tables 4 and 5) of the causality tests are rather similar to those without structural breaks. 
The bidirectional causality between Israel's and Syria's military expenditures still holds true, in 
addition to causality running from Israel's to Egypt's military spending (in the bivariate setting 
only). Once again, the causality links when military burden is taken are weaker and almost 
nonexistent. These findings may indicate that the rivals react to the absolute level of the military 
spending and not to the relative measure. 
  The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel that was signed in 1979 marked the collapse 
of the Arab front line bloc when the largest and strongest member ceased to be involved in the 
confrontation with Israel and left Syria as the major Arab rival of Israel. Table 6 provides us with 
insights into the possible impact of the peace treaty on the dynamics of the conflict. The analysis 
complements our causality tests that incorporated two structural breaks. Our causality tests on 
the post-1979 period reveal rather surprising results; with the exception of Jordan, Arab 
countries, including Egypt, respond to both Israel's military expenditures and burden. Moreover, 
Israel responds only to Syrian military burden. One possible explanation might be that despite 
the "cold" peace, Egypt, the leading Arab country, continues to see in Israel a threat especially 
since the Palestinians are still under Israeli occupation. Another likely explanation is the short 
time span (1979-2004) that could undermine the reliability of our analysis. 
  Our last assessment of the causal relationships between the military expenditures and 
burden of Israel and its Arab neighbors involves applying the generalized FEVD to gauge the 
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strength of the out-of-sample causal relationships. By decomposing the variance of the forecast 
error of, say Israel's military expenditures, into proportions attributed to shocks in all variables in 
the system including itself, variance decomposition can provide an indication of Granger 
causality beyond the sample period. The results of the generalized FEVD for up to ten years 
ahead are portrayed in tables 7 and 8. Table 7 conveys a relatively strong causality running from 
Israel's to Egypt's, Syria's, and Arab's military measures. For example a shock to Israel's military 
expenditures explains 12.34% of the forecast error variance of Syria's military expenditures at 
period zero and the percentage rises to reach 28.52% after 10 years. Our results indicate that 
Syria responds with higher intensity than the rest to shocks in Israel's military spending. The 
other direction of causality emerges from Table 8; Israel responds only to shocks in Syrian 
military measures. Overall, our FEVD results are in line with our causality findings. Causality 
runs mainly from Israel's to Arab's military measures and Israel usually responds to changes in 
Syrian military expenditures.   
7. Summary 
  This article examines the dynamics of the Israeli-Arab conflict over the period 1960-2004 
to determine whether an arms race exists between Israel and its Arab adversaries. To do so we 
apply two methodologies; first, a causality procedure developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
that avoids the shortcomings that the traditional Granger causality tests suffer from; second, the 
Generalized FEVD proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) that overcomes the need for ordering in 
the VAR system that is necessary in the traditional Cholesky decomposition. 
  Our analysis included both bivariate (Israel with each Arab country separately) and 
quadvariate (Israel with all Arab countries simultaneously) VARs to accommodate collective 
action and/or free riding among Arab countries.   18 
  We find that in most cases, Arabs respond to changes in both the military expenditures 
and military burden of Israel. A bidirectional causality is often detected between Israel and Syria, 
countries that are still in a state of enmity. In almost all of our tests, Jordan was not found to be 
actively involved in an arms race with Israel and might have been acting as a free rider. The 
results hold intact also when we incorporate the possibility of structural breaks in the defense 
series and when examining the nature of the conflict after signing the peace treaty between Egypt 
and Israel in 1979. Our results are consistent with the previous studies that addressed the nature 
of the Israeli-Arab arms race. 
  As we indicated earlier, arms races analysis, in general, and in the Middle East, in 
particular, can serve countries (the U.S., for example) and international institutions (potentially 
the U.N. and the E.U.) in weighting the effects of their intervention (foreign aid, exercising 
political and economic pressure, and other measures) not only on one country but all the 
countries that are involved in the conflict.    19 
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Table 1 - ADF Unit Root Test 
Real Military Expenditures 
  Levels  First differences 
  ADF  Lag  ADF  lag 
Egypt  -2.83  3  -5.09***  0 
Israel  -1.96  0  -7.85***  0 
Jordan  -2.38  0  -7.65***  0 
Syria  -1.32  0  -5.04***  0 
Arab  -2.41  2  -3.04**  1 
Military Burden 
Egypt  -2.66  2  -3.03**  1 
Israel  -1.83  0  -8.30***  0 
Jordan  -2.33  0  -6.07***  1 
Syria  -1.70  0  -7.96***  0 
Arab  -2.71  2  -4.40***  0 
Notes: 
Optimal lag length based on SIC with 8 maximum lags allowed. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 2 – Causality Test (Bivariate) 
Arabi  Lag  Israel ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Arabi  Arabi ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Israel 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt  1  2.64*  0.06 
Jordan  1  1.03  0.15 
Syria  1  3.65*  4.47** 
Arab  1  3.12*  0.01 
Military Burden 
Egypt  2  6.12**  0.50 
Jordan  1  0.76  1.14 
Syria  1  0.04  7.10*** 
Arab  2  4.31  0.43 
Notes: 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ indicates the direction of causality. 
Lags are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3 – Causality Test (Quadvariate)  
Arabi  Lag  Israel ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Arabi  Arabi ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Israel 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt  1  0.83  0.00 
Jordan  1  0.42  2.16 
Syria  1  3.52*  6.87*** 
Military Burden 
Egypt  4  2.11  7.85* 
Jordan  4  2.75  2.62 
Syria  4  6.06  4.17 
Notes: 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ indicates the direction of causality. 
Lags are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4 – Causality Test (Bivariate) with 2 Breaks allowed 
Arabi  Lag  Israel ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Arabi  Arabi ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Israel 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt  1  5.51**  0.28 
Jordan  1  1.24  0.43 
Syria  1  3.38*  4.34** 
Arab  1  0.75  0.86 
Military Burden 
Egypt  2  3.70  2.25 
Jordan  1  0.84  1.49 
Syria  1  0.06  3.36* 
Arab  2  2.38  2.08 
 
Notes: 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ indicates the direction of causality. 
Lags are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
Break points based on Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2008); Military 
expenditures – Egypt: 1969, 1977; Israel: 1972, 1982; Jordan: 1975, 1983; 
Syria: 1974, 1986; Arab: 1968, 1987.  Military burden - Egypt: 1969, 1977; 
Israel: 1972, 1986; Jordan: 1981, 1989; Syria: 1967, 1986; Arab: 1969, 
1977. 
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Table 5 – Causality Test (Quadvariate) with 2 Breaks allowed  
Arabi  Lag  Israel ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Arabi  Arabi ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Israel 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt  1  0.93  0.95 
Jordan  1  0.62  0.00 
Syria  1  3.57*  8.21*** 
Military Burden 
Egypt  4  9.05*  2.02 
Jordan  4  5.06  0.63 
Syria  4  5.05  1.33 
 
Notes: 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ indicates the direction of causality. 
Lags are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
Break points based on Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2008); Military expenditures – 
Egypt: 1969, 1977; Israel: 1972, 1982; Jordan: 1975, 1983; Syria: 1974, 1986; 
Arab: 1968, 1987.  Military burden - Egypt: 1969, 1977; Israel: 1972, 1986; 
Jordan: 1981, 1989; Syria: 1967, 1986; Arab: 1969, 1977. 
 
   28 
 
Table 6 – Causality Test (Bivariate) Post-1979 
Arabi  Lag  Israel ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Arabi  Arabi ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Israel 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt  1  5.79**  1.66 
Jordan  1  1.22  1.74 
Syria  1  2.58*  0.56 
Arab  1  5.35**  1.72 
Military Burden 
Egypt  1  5.89**  0.87 
Jordan  2  5.52*  0.48 
Syria  2  0.93  8.66** 
Arab  1  6.64***  0.05 
Notes: 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ indicates the direction of causality. 
Lags are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.   29 
 
Table 7 – Generalized FEVD for Arab Countries (%) 
  Explained by own shock after … 
years 
Explained by a shock to Israel’s 
military measure after … years 
  0  1  5  10  0  1  5  10 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt  100  92.60  92.60  92.60  4.16  13.51  13.51  13.51 
Jordan  100  99.32  99.22  99.21  0.15  0.71  0.82  0.82 
Syria  100  95.32  85.17  85.09  12.34  21.98  28.48  28.52 
Arab  100  90.36  90.35  90.35  7.19  20.19  20.21  20.21 
Military Burden 
Egypt  100  91.57  92.02  92.03  2.66  13.46  13.08  13.08 
Jordan  100  98.56  98.16  98.16  6.68  6.82  7.03  7.03 
Syria  100  100  100  100  16.98  17.04  17.05  17.05 
Arab  100  93.73  94.22  94.22  5.93  14.61  14.20  14.22   30 
 
Table 8 – Generalized FEVD for Israel (%) 
Arabi  Explained By a shock to Arabi 
military measure after … years 
Explained by Own shock after … 
years 
  0  1  5  10  0  1  5  10 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt  4.16  4.32  4.32  4.32  100  99.97  99.97  99.97 
Jordan  0.15  0.33  0.36  0.36  100  99.87  99.85  99.85 
Syria  12.34  13.87  14.33  14.31  100  93.50  92.85  92.83 
Arab  7.19  7.02  7.02  7.02  100  99.96  99.96  99.96 
Military Burden 
Egypt  2.66  2.50  3.93  3.94  100  99.94  98.14  98.13 
Jordan  6.68  6.27  6.28  6.28  100  99.34  99.15  99.15 
Syria  16.98  18.72  20.55  20.55  100  90.41  87.04  87.03 
Arab  5.93  5.43  6.11  6.12  100  99.65  98.52  98.51 
 